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Is China the Kingmaker in Myanmar's Civil War?
- The Red Line
- 42 minutes ago
- 10 min read
Listen to this episode on: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Youtube
Once hailed as a beacon of democratic reform in Southeast Asia, Myanmar has devolved into a fractured state defined by a brutal, multi-front civil war following the 2021 military coup. The Junta clings to power in the central cities through terror and forced conscription, while a patchwork of resistance forces controls the periphery but struggles with donor fatigue and ammunition shortages. Yet, following the shockwaves of Operation 1027 and the rise of a narcotics-and-scam-fueled war economy, the conflict has shifted. China, the region’s hesitant kingmaker, is now applying direct pressure on both sides to secure its strategic access to the Indian Ocean. With the country effectively split and neither side possessing the strength to deliver a knockout blow, the question remains: is Myanmar destined to fracture like Yugoslavia, or can a unified state still emerge from the ashes? Our panel of experts examines the stalled frontlines, Beijing’s evolving strategy, and the grim reality of who, if anyone, can actually govern the nation in 2026.
LISTEN TO THE PROGRAM HERE
EPISODE SUMMARY:
PART I: From Bad to Worse - (02:15)
with Zachary Abuza
- Professor at the National War College
- Author of Six Books
- Fmr. Columnist for Benar News and Radio Free Asia
Post-coup battlefield realignment and insurgent mobilisation: Abuza argues the coup did not create a resistance movement from scratch, but rapidly activated long-standing Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs) that already controlled territory and maintained experienced armed wings. Several EROs quickly aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG), while other groups that had previously stayed on the sidelines entered the conflict once it became clear the junta could not impose quick control. The net effect is a fragmented war ecology, with multiple armed actors and shifting alliances rather than a single coherent opposition.
The Tatmadaw launched the coup despite constitutional veto power: The Tatmadaw, in Abuza’s account, believed it could protect its political and economic prerogatives under the 2008 constitution through reserved seats and control of key ministries, with limited civilian oversight of budgets and personnel. What changed was the perceived trajectory: parliamentary pressure to amend the constitution and the military proxy party’s poor performance in the November 2020 election signalled a longer-term erosion of military privilege. The leadership’s core miscalculation was assuming any domestic backlash and international response would be brief, allowing a return to the pre-2015 “normal” of military rule.
Control of territory vs population and coercive counter-insurgency logic: Abuza distinguishes between geographic control and political authority, suggesting the opposition holds roughly 40% of territory, with a further tranche contested, while the junta retains the major population centres and therefore claims de facto control over much of the populace. This urban grip matters operationally and psychologically, enabling the military to message inevitability to middle-class urban constituencies even as it loses ground elsewhere. He characterises Tatmadaw doctrine as coercive rather than population-centric, describing the “four cuts” approach and heavy air and artillery use as designed to raise civilian costs and deter support for the resistance.
Opposition sustainment, ammunition constraints, and coalition fragility: On rebel financing, Abuza highlights a mixed portfolio: diaspora fundraising, inventive financial instruments (bonds and “land” auctions), offshore banking workarounds, and local taxation or resource rents in areas where armed groups hold mines and trade routes. He stresses that the main constraint is not always access to weapons, given captures and black-market flows, but recurring ammunition shortages that shape operational tempo. Coordination among EROs is described as historically unprecedented under the NUG’s federalism bargain, but structurally fragile, with mistrust creating a persistent risk of fragmentation and side deals as the war stretches into a sixth year.
Operation 1027 and China’s coercive balancing strategy: Abuza frames the late-2023 offensive as a major inflection point, with alliance forces seizing key border trade routes, revenue-generating assets (including rare earth and gems), and pressuring nodes tied to Chinese infrastructure interests. China is portrayed as transactional, prioritising border stability and protection of investments over ideological alignment, and willing to lean on both insurgents and the junta to shape outcomes. He describes Beijing using hard leverage to choke opposition resupply while simultaneously boosting junta resilience through drones, munitions, industrial support, and encouragement of rapid conscription, all in pursuit of an “off-ramp” that keeps the military represented in any future settlement.
PART II: Divide and Conquer - (34:55)
with Derek Mitchell
- Snr. Adv. to the Office of the President and the Asia Program - Fmr. US. Amb to Myanmar (2012 - 2016)
- Fmr. Pres. of the National Democratic Institute
“Control” and Tatmadaw cohesion in a fractured state: Mitchell stresses that “control” is now an ambiguous concept in Myanmar, because the state is fractured and the junta is struggling to reassert authority across much of the country. He argues the Tatmadaw remains disciplined and cohesive as a political actor when seizing and holding central power, with a strong esprit de corps. Operationally, however, it lacks a coherent national strategic vision and tends to fight in a highly localised manner, leaving it stretched thin at the national level.
Resistance structure and the limits of coordination: Mitchell pushes back on the common “resistance vs junta” framing, describing a landscape of armed actors primarily focused on their own regions and narrow interests. While there are pockets of coordination and relationships among some groups, including organised alliances in specific theatres, he depicts this as the exception rather than the rule. The default pattern is decentralised warfare shaped by Myanmar’s long-standing patchwork of identities and localised political economies, which constrains unified planning, intelligence sharing, and sustained joint offensives.
China’s objectives: hedging, leverage, and arbitration rather than allegiance: Mitchell characterises Beijing’s posture as fundamentally interest-driven: stabilise the border, protect investments, preserve access to the Indian Ocean, and minimise Western influence. In his view, China’s priority is not the internal political settlement as such, but ensuring no outcome produces state collapse or an authority structure hostile to Chinese equities. This underpins a “play all sides” approach, maintaining relationships with whoever is dominant locally so Chinese interests remain insulated regardless of battlefield shifts.
China’s on-the-ground footprint and the “dark area” problem along the border: On reports of Chinese personnel in Myanmar, Mitchell suggests training activity is plausible, noting that porous border dynamics have long enabled the presence of trainers, retired military figures, and other actors operating from the Yunnan side. He implies that not all of this is necessarily centrally directed, but that Beijing can exert control if it chooses to clamp down, even as local actors may act opportunistically “to make some money.” He is sceptical of a clean “breakaway state” scenario being deliberately engineered in the Donetsk/Luhansk mould, but flags that Myanmar can still produce strategic surprises.
External and regional engagement: low Western risk tolerance, uneven regional leadership, and an unresolved end-state: Mitchell frames Russia’s role as a pragmatic entry point into Southeast Asia centred on arms sales and mutual relief from international isolation, while arguing no Western actor matches China’s will or tolerance for risk in Myanmar. He notes many Western firms are exiting due to high operational and political risk, whereas China persists because its economic corridor and energy-linked infrastructure are tied to compelling national interests. On the region, he highlights frustration in Thailand and a broader absence of “visionary leadership”, warning that drift and fragmentation create predictable spillovers (refugees, illicit economies, trafficking, narcotics) while also leaving Myanmar without any actor holding a universal mandate to govern. The core problem, in his telling, is political: Myanmar’s unity amid diversity remains unresolved, with proliferating local “fiefdoms” and a history of junta divide-and-rule tactics making a durable federal or confederal settlement harder, not easier.
PART III: Peer Pressure - (1:01:52)
with Jason Tower
- Regional Analyst and Snr. Expert at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime - Fmr. Myanmar Country director of the United States Institute of Peace - Regional Expert on Myanmar and its Relations with China.
China’s strategic stakes and “two oceans” logic: Tower argues the most consequential post-2023 shift is China’s deeper involvement and more overt interference in Myanmar’s war. He frames Myanmar as central to Beijing’s “two oceans” strategy, providing a second corridor to the Indian Ocean that reduces reliance on the Malacca Strait and mitigates vulnerability in a South China Sea contingency. This includes the operating oil and gas pipeline, described as the sole source of piped gas to China’s south-western provinces, alongside trade and connectivity imperatives tied to the development strategy for provinces such as Yunnan.
Battlefield swings since 2023 and the pivot point of Chinese intervention: Tower describes 2023–24 as a period in which resistance forces gained momentum and inflicted unprecedented defeats, including major territorial reversals and pushing pressure toward Mandalay. He then characterises the subsequent shift as a reversal driven largely by China’s growing interference, which helped arrest resistance advances and reconstitute junta capacity. The implication is that battlefield “momentum” in Myanmar is no longer primarily endogenous, but increasingly contingent on external constraint and enablement, particularly from Beijing.
Beijing oscillates between tacit tolerance, coercive constraint, and managed escalation: Tower presents China’s apparent policy swings as purposeful rather than erratic: initial tolerance for resistance operations was followed by coercive pressure once advances threatened to upend Beijing’s risk calculus. He points to China cutting resource flows and applying direct leverage on key northern actors, including allegations of senior resistance figures being detained or otherwise neutralised when they “went too far.” This coercion, paired with renewed support to the junta, bought Naypyidaw time to implement forced conscription and rearm with drones and other materiel, enabling partial territorial recovery through late 2024 and across much of 2025.
Junta dependence and concession-making under Chinese leverage: Tower argues the Tatmadaw has become strategically dependent on China to a degree that enables Beijing to extract concessions previously off-limits. He cites reported agreements allowing Chinese private security and broader security-sector presence on Myanmar soil, including legal revisions to enable armed security deployments. He also highlights a widening pattern of concessions on Chinese economic projects, raising questions about whether the junta is trading away Myanmar’s national interest in exchange for regime survival and operational support.
China’s hedging architecture: leverage through northern groups, red lines, and political end-state management: Tower contends Beijing has not fully pivoted to either side because its leverage depends on maintaining channels to the northern armed groups as well as the junta. China cannot back the Tatmadaw to the hilt without risking loss of influence over key border actors, so it uses incentives (“peace and development” framing, economic benefits) and punishments to enforce red lines on both sides. Strategically, Tower suggests Beijing wants the military brought back into a form of international legitimacy, pushing ASEAN to normalise relations via acceptance of the junta’s sham election, while the likely near-term trajectory is a China-backed web of bilateral ceasefires alongside continued expansion of transnational crime and a bleak outlook for human security and atrocities.
PART IV: The New Normal - (1:15:09)
with Steve Ross
- Snr. Fellow at the Stimson Center
- Fmr. Snr. Advisor and Program Director at the Richardson Center for Global Engagement
- Fmr. Election Observer in Myanmar
Operation 1027 as the watershed and China’s decisive pivot: Ross frames the launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023 as the single biggest structural change since 2022, because it pulled fence-sitting ethnic armed groups into the conflict at scale and altered the incentives of external stakeholders. The offensive pushed beyond the limits of what Beijing considered tolerable, forcing China off its hedging posture. From August 2024, Ross argues China swung decisively behind the regime and, over roughly the last 18 months, delivered support that materially shifted battlefield momentum back toward the junta.
Conflict fatigue, “stability” narratives, and junta reconstitution through conscription: Ross emphasises a widening fatigue dynamic in Myanmar, including among constituencies opposed to the military, with parts of the business community in particular looking for an exit ramp. In that context, some actors interpret the recent elections as a potential pathway to greater stability, even if that hope is pragmatic rather than legitimising. Militarily, he highlights the early-2024 activation of a long-dormant conscription law, implemented from March–April 2024, and estimates the regime has inducted around 100,000 conscripts, trained them rapidly, and pushed them to the front. This mobilisation cycle, he argues, helped stabilise the junta’s force posture by filling manpower gaps and freeing other units for combat tasks, contributing to the shift in momentum over the past year and a half.
Opposition manpower vs sustainment: coerced recruitment and the ammunition choke point: On the resistance side, Ross describes recruitment as uneven: some peripheral ethnic areas have moved toward forced or coerced conscription, mirroring the junta’s approach, while parts of the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and allied groups still draw on motivated volunteers who see the war as existential. He argues, however, that manpower is increasingly secondary to sustainment, with weapons and especially ammunition becoming the binding constraint for the resistance. A key driver is China’s pressure on northern armed groups to restrict arms transfers to other ethnic forces and to Bamar PDFs, effectively tightening supply lines. In Ross’s assessment, this external throttling of munitions flows is likely to be more decisive than recruitment trends over the coming year.
Likely junta offensive vectors: resource nodes, trade corridors, and contested strongholds: Ross sketches a scenario in which the regime, emboldened by recent momentum, prospective legitimacy gains from the elections, and renewed external support, attempts serious counteroffensives against the strongest ethnic armed positions. He flags Rakhine as a priority theatre given the Arakan Army’s scale and territorial control, while also pointing to the south-east where the junta has incentives to reopen trade routes with Thailand disrupted by fighting. In the north, he highlights Kachin as a potential target, particularly after the Kachin Independence Army’s reported seizure of townships with high concentrations of critical mineral mines in October 2024. The common logic across these axes is a counter-insurgency focus on areas where no durable deals exist and where resource rents and cross-border commerce can be captured or denied.
War economy consolidation, regional hedging, and the absence of a credible national end-state: Ross depicts an economy narrower and more informal than in earlier years, with GDP estimated to be roughly 15–16% lower than in 2021, alongside rapid growth in illicit revenue streams. He highlights the scale-up of opium and methamphetamine production, and the expansion of scam centres as a core pillar of the wartime illicit economy, with large numbers of trafficked workers and persistent linkages between regime-aligned and peripheral actors despite periodic crackdowns. Regionally, he argues India rhetorically supports democracy but privileges engagement with the centre out of fear of collapse, while Bangladesh views Myanmar almost entirely through the Rohingya refugee lens and pursues dual-track engagement with both Naypyidaw and border powerholders. ASEAN, constrained by non-interference and consensus rules, may slide toward gradual re-engagement led by mainland members, potentially normalising the junta in practice. Politically, Ross is sceptical of any clean post-junta transition: even if the military vanished, he expects the NUG would struggle to assemble a coherent central mandate amid enduring ethnic mistrust, entrenched parallel governance structures, and competing visions of federalism versus autonomy, leaving no obvious “silver bullet” for conflict termination.
Is China the Kingmaker in Myanmar's Civil War? (Released February 10th, 2026)
- By Bertil Lintner
- By Daniel Combs
- By Francis Wade
This episode is dedicated to our Patreon members: Hamish Ball, Lander De Bock, Nate Glassmen, Jane Sprouster, Craig Mitchell, Nick Rogers, JA Gormley, JordanL, Bonnie Acosta, Mack Dolley, Caspian C, Just **** **, Just **** it, if you've got an ********, **** it, if you think hes long, just **** it, dont *** ********* whoa your such a **** (sorry, this was their actual Patreon username), Kathy and Brent Irvine, Mark Tatler, Seanglea, Pat Gaughan, Frida Anderson, Kevin Pierce, Eric Ray, Jens Nordberg, Robert Neilson, Sandboxspeech, Dave Crompton, Shane, Alexander Dewing, Ltsox, Lee, Adriano Garcia, T B, Ltksox, Drew, and Diana J Austin, and a very special thanks to A.
Zachary Abuza is not appearing here in an official capacity, and his views, thoughts and opinions are his own, and do not represent the official views or policies of the US. government or Department of War
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