How Important are Strategic Bombers in 2025?

The Red Line
Sep 9
6 min read

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Once the spearhead of Allied victory in World War II and the backbone of nuclear deterrence in the early Cold War, strategic bombers are often dismissed today as relics of a bygone era. Yet three powers, the United States, Russia, and China, continue to field formidable bomber fleets. Washington employs them for precision strikes in contested airspace across the globe, Moscow for launching missile salvos into theatres like Syria and Ukraine, and Beijing as a key secondary strike asset. Now, with all three preparing to unveil next-generation platforms that promise capabilities well beyond their current fleets, the question is clear: how will these aircraft shape the battlefields of 2025, and which nation will bring its new bomber to the skies first? Our panel of experts examines the evolving role of strategic bombers and what these upcoming platforms could mean for the balance of power in the air.

LISTEN TO THE PROGRAM HERE

EPISODE SUMMARY:

PART I: Stars and Strikes - (03:01)

with Col. David Gordon

- Ch. of the Dept. of Leadership and War fighting at the US Air Force's Air War College

- Fmr. Global Strike Command Chair

- Fmr. Dep. Chief of the Nuclear Operations Division of the US Joint Staff

Strategic Bombers in the Force Structure:
Colonel Gordon emphasises that strategic bombers remain a pivotal element of the US Air Force’s global strike capability, particularly as overseas basing has reduced since the Cold War. Their long-range reach enables penetration of difficult theatres where forward-deployed assets are either unavailable or at risk. This ensures strategic bombers continue to provide both conventional strike capacity and a nuclear deterrent option.
The Triad and Deterrence Signalling:
Within the US nuclear triad, bombers play a distinct role beyond ICBMs and SLBMs by providing visible and flexible deterrence. Unlike missiles, bombers can be launched, recalled, and used for signalling escalation or restraint, thereby giving policymakers more options. The example of the B-2 strike on Iran’s Natanz facility demonstrates the bomber force’s ability to deliver both conventional and nuclear payloads with precision and global reach.
Platform Roles and Trade-offs:
Each US bomber has evolved through trade-offs between cost, survivability, and capability. The B-52, despite its age, endures due to adaptability, low operating costs, and its utility in both nuclear and conventional operations. The B-1B, while modern and capable, is being phased out due to high operating costs and maintenance challenges. The B-2 provides unmatched stealth penetration but at significant financial burden, making it a niche yet indispensable tool for highly defended environments.
Survivability and the Cat-and-Mouse Dynamic:
The stealth advantages of the B-2 have eroded over time as adversaries field increasingly advanced sensors, radars, and integrated air defence systems. As Gordon notes, no platform can guarantee penetration alone, and success will depend on joint force integration. This reflects the enduring cat-and-mouse contest between bomber survivability and adversary detection technologies, with Ukraine and Iran offering recent operational lessons in air defence resilience.
The B-21 Raider and Future Structure:
The B-21 Raider is positioned to become the backbone of the US bomber fleet, offering open-systems architecture to allow continuous upgrades against evolving threats. Unlike previous procurement failures, the programme has so far remained on time and budget, with planned procurement of around 100 aircraft. Future force structure appears to be consolidating around a dual fleet of legacy B-52s, modernised with standoff and hypersonic weapons, complemented by B-21s for stealth penetration, signalling a streamlined, sustainable, and technologically advanced bomber force for the coming decades.

PART II: Caught in the Spider Web - (27:40)

with Valeriy Akimenko

- Snr. Research Associate at the Conflict Studies Research Center

- Fmr. BBC Monitor - Expert on the Russian Military and Security Services

Force size and modernisation reality: Akimenko assesses the operational Tu-160 fleet at ~10 airworthy aircraft from a nominal ~15, underscoring how maintenance and upgrade cycles constrain availability. Russia’s two-track programme pairs life-extension of legacy bombers with limited new-build Tu-160M/M2 airframes, “three, maybe four” completed to date. Engine upgrades (NK-32-02) are intended to add range (on the order of ~1,000 km), but throughput is slow, keeping overall numbers modest.
Roles across the triad of bombers: Russia fields three principal types: the first-generation Tu-95MS “Bear” (now a cruise-missile carrier), and two second-generation swing-wing supersonic bombers, the Tu-22M3 “Backfire” (theatre-range strike with Kh-22/Kh-32) and Tu-160/M “Blackjack” (standoff ALCM delivery). In Ukraine, these platforms contribute to strategic non-nuclear deterrence via long-range strikes but are increasingly overshadowed by mass Shahed-type UAV usage. Questions persist over the real-world effectiveness of Kh-101 strikes given substantial interception rates.
Attrition, capacity and rebuild constraints: Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb” drone attacks reportedly disabled a notable slice of Long-Range Aviation; Akimenko judges roughly ten Tu-95MS out of a ~50-aircraft staple affected. Even allowing for airworthiness shortfalls, he cautions the force remains sizeable and not to be written off. Reconstitution is constrained: bombers are the least critical leg of Russia’s nuclear triad, sanctions bite, industrial bandwidth is war-focused, and pre-war modernisation already moved “exceedingly slowly”.
Strategic utility against NATO/US: Given limited tanker capacity, lack of stealth on legacy types, and layered Western air defences, intercontinental bomber penetration against the US is deemed doubtful; northern-based one-way notions are theoretical at best. Europe is a more practicable target set, yet proximity to dense IADS still imposes high risk as aircraft approach launch baskets. Claims that S-400/S-500 reliably counter stealth remain unproven; equally, the cat-and-mouse around low-observable design is hampered by Russia’s industrial/design limitations.
PAK-DA credibility, budgets, and the 30-year outlook: The PAK-DA stealth bomber remains opaque and, in Akimenko’s view, “uncertain” and irrelevant in wartime conditions; headline capabilities and timelines have not materialised. Budget pressure from the Ukraine war makes PAK-DA the prime candidate for shelving, while even Su-57 prioritisation is debatable given current operational needs. Over the long term, Russia is likely to persist with a reduced mix, handfuls of Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160/M, incrementally modernised rather than replaced by a clean-sheet stealth platform.

PART III: The Catch Up - (46:40)

with Bill Sweetman

- Aerospace Journalist

- Fmr. Technical Editor and Aerospace and Defence Editor at Jane's - Fmr. Editor in Cheif at Aviation Week Network

From legacy bombers to a long-range strike enterprise: China’s bomber arm has shifted from a small, dated fleet to a broad long-range combat aviation force. It now blends electronic warfare, standoff missile delivery, and sea-/land-attack roles at theatre scale. Bombers provide mobility and payload flexibility that fixed land-based brigades and magazine-limited submarines cannot, enabling rapid re-tasking and re-arming across dispersed airfields. Practically, a bomber can generate one to two armed sorties per day while tailoring weapon mixes to evolving targets.
The H-6 family: breadth, volume, and “good-enough” design: The H-6 lineage (derived from the Tu-16) spans nuclear, maritime strike, cruise-missile, tanker, and extended-range variants (e.g., H-6A/G/H/M/K/J/N; H-6U/DU). Beijing fields roughly 220–230 H-6s, giving it the largest strategic bomber inventory of the three powers. Continuous production and incremental re-engining/avionics upgrades have produced a versatile “missile truck” with low programme risk. For many standoff missions, this approach is functionally comparable to Western second-generation platforms, at far lower acquisition and restart costs.
Why not a supersonic swing-wing fleet?: Experience with the B-1 shows that low-level penetration against modern IADS is no longer survivable, pushing such aircraft toward conventional standoff roles akin to the B-52. In that mission set, a modernised H-6 often suffices, especially given China’s warm production line and tailored sub-variants. By contrast, the US must recapitalise aged B-52 airframes and faces costly rebuild cycles to sustain numbers. China’s risk-averse, iterative path has delivered capacity and relevance without a wholesale generational leap.
H-20: ambition, timelines, and technical hurdles: The H-20 is widely expected to be a flying-wing stealth bomber with 8,500–10,000 km class range, aimed at targets such as Guam without tanker support. Public evidence of a prototype or first flight is still absent, but a prototype could appear “fairly soon,” with a typical ~8-year arc from first article to initial operational status. Propulsion integration behind low-observable inlets is a central challenge, potentially driving a less “pure stealth” solution. China may field the H-20 as part of a system-of-systems, pairing the bomber with SEAD/DEAD, anti-radiation weapons, and unmanned teammates to degrade defences.
Employment concepts and the 30-year outlook: In a Taiwan scenario, H-6s would likely deliver land-attack salvos to attrit defences and contribute massed anti-carrier strikes to mission-kill a CSG. More broadly, the PLAAF is pivoting from “quantity” to “quality,” investing heavily in AESA-equipped fighters, airborne battle-management, standoff jamming, and weapon-guidance support—areas where the West has suffered gaps. This integrated enabler-first model underpins a steadily more capable bomber-missile complex. Over the next three decades, expect a mixed force of numerous, improved H-6s and a maturing H-20 to provide flexible, theatre-wide precision strike at scale.

How Important are Strategic Bombers in 2025? (Released September 9th, 2025)

David Gordon is not appearing here in an official capacity, and his views, thoughts and opinions are his own, and do not represent the official views or policies of the US. government or Air Force