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Writer's pictureThe Red Line

Episode 124. The Rise of Chinese Private Security Companies (PSCs and PMCs)

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Chinese private security companies (PSCs) are beginning to expand their influence in the global security market, with thousands of these companies now operating in over 40 countries. Despite legal restrictions preventing them from being armed, these firms are increasingly finding ways to circumvent such regulations. This raises critical questions: Will China leverage these companies to bypass international rules, engage in grey-zone combat, or establish footholds for future military bases abroad? We delve into these issues with our expert panel.


LISTEN TO THE PROGRAM HERE



 

EPISODE SUMMARY:


PART I: Modern Lawfare - (04:38)

with Carl Peterson

- Writer and analyst at Militant Wire Network.

- Expert on Chinese military and PSCs.

- Author of papers on PSCs' rapid growth.


  1. Distinction Between Private Military and Security Companies: The discussion highlights the difference between Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies. PMCs like Wagner Group and Blackwater are engaged in military-like activities, including combat operations and intelligence gathering, often in active conflict zones. In contrast, PSCs focus on non-military security services, such as protecting civilians and securing non-warzone properties. The blurred lines between these roles, especially with the involvement of countries like China, complicate legal and operational distinctions, impacting international security norms.

  2. Chinese Private Security Companies and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Chinese PSCs play a crucial role in securing Chinese investments, particularly in the Belt and Road Initiative projects. Unlike PMCs, Chinese PSCs often rely on surveillance systems and management roles rather than direct armed engagement. This approach allows China to protect its overseas assets while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability, which is particularly important given the ambiguous legal frameworks governing these entities.

  3. Legal Ambiguities and State Ties: The legal status of PSCs and PMCs varies significantly between countries, with China’s legislation being particularly ambiguous. While Chinese PSCs are legally distinct from the state, they often operate under conditions that suggest state influence or control, especially when involved in international operations. This legal ambiguity creates challenges in accountability and regulation, potentially allowing these companies to operate in ways that blur the lines between private enterprise and state military action.

  4. Potential for Militarization and Strategic Use: The discussion raises concerns about the potential for PSCs to be used as tools for state military objectives, particularly in strategic regions like the South China Sea. The ease with which logistics facilities can be militarized suggests that PSCs could be deployed to establish a semi-military presence, exerting pressure on other nations while maintaining plausible deniability. This tactic could serve as a means for states like China to expand their influence without overt military engagement, complicating international security dynamics.

  5. Challenges in Accountability and Prosecution: Holding PSCs and PMCs accountable for illegal activities is fraught with challenges, particularly when these companies operate in complex legal and geopolitical environments. The hypothetical scenario discussed illustrates the difficulties in prosecuting crimes committed by PSCs, especially when these entities are tied to powerful states like China. The lack of clear jurisdiction, the complexity of international legal structures, and the potential for state intervention in prosecutions make it unlikely that these companies will face significant legal consequences, raising concerns about the unchecked power and influence of such entities in global security.



PART II: Blurred Lines - (30:11)

With Nick Thompson

- Former CIA paramilitary officer and Tier One operator.

- Extensive experience in Middle East and Asia missions.

- Currently working at Anduril Industries.



  1. Strategic Differences in PSC Operations: Chinese Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies differ significantly from their Western and Russian counterparts. While Western and Russian operators often engage overtly, with established local networks and visible presence, Chinese PSCs operate more discreetly, emphasizing counterintelligence and security. This reclusive approach, driven by Beijing, limits local engagement and initiative, reflecting a top-down control structure that prioritizes security over adaptability, which could hinder their effectiveness in dynamic environments.

  2. Beijing's Centralized Control and Intelligence Compartmentalization: Unlike Russian PMCs like Wagner, which have access to national intelligence and greater autonomy, Chinese PSCs operate under strict compartmentalization, receiving only the information deemed necessary by Beijing. This centralized control limits their operational flexibility but ensures loyalty and mitigates the risk of independent actions that could contradict state objectives. However, this approach may evolve as Chinese PMCs gain more experience, potentially leading to a more aggressive and intelligence-driven role in global security operations.

  3. Challenges in Combat Readiness and Experience: A significant challenge for Chinese PSCs is their lack of combat experience, especially compared to Russian and Western counterparts. High turnover rates among Chinese PSC operators exacerbate this issue, preventing the development of seasoned personnel. While Beijing restricts these companies' access to firearms officially, reports indicate that some units are well-armed, reflecting a disparity between official policy and operational reality. This gap highlights the complexities and potential vulnerabilities in China's approach to private security.

  4. Escalating Risks in BRI-Linked Operations: Chinese PSCs are increasingly deployed to protect Belt and Road Initiative projects in volatile regions like Pakistan and Africa, where tensions between Chinese operators and local populations have led to violent incidents. These incidents, such as those in Zambia and Pakistan, have strained China's diplomatic relations and forced a reevaluation of its PSC deployment strategies. Beijing's response includes deploying more PSCs to these regions, but the growing threat environment and reputational risks pose significant challenges to the sustainability of this approach.

  5. Maritime PSC Operations and Strategic Ambitions: China's maritime PSC operations are becoming more prominent, particularly in combating piracy in regions like the Gulf of Guinea. These efforts are part of a broader strategy to secure Chinese maritime interests and assert influence in global shipping lanes. However, the high cost and complexity of these operations suggest that China views them as essential to its broader geopolitical ambitions, potentially using PSCs as bridgehead bases for future military or strategic actions. This maritime focus, combined with China's cautious expansion of PSC roles, underscores a deliberate and multifaceted approach to global security challenges.



PART III: Demonstrated Deniability. - (45:26)

With Alessandro Arduino

- Leading expert on Chinese private security firms.

- Advisor to the International Code of Conduct Association.

- Affiliate lecturer at King's College London.


  1. Late Entry and Catching Up in the Private Security Sector: Chinese Private Security Companies are relatively late entrants in the global private security market compared to American and Russian counterparts. While they have rapidly expanded to protect Chinese investments and personnel abroad, particularly in Belt and Road Initiative projects, they still face significant challenges in professionalism and effectiveness. China's approach emphasizes minimizing risks of incidents similar to those associated with Blackwater and Wagner, aligning with their narrative of a "win-win" strategy in the Global South.

  2. Limited International Appeal and Linguistic Barriers: Despite offering competitive pricing, Chinese PSCs struggle to gain traction outside BRI projects. This is partly due to linguistic and cultural barriers, as well as the tendency of Chinese operators to isolate themselves in gated compounds, limiting interaction with local communities. These challenges reduce the appeal of Chinese PSCs to international clients, particularly in regions where local engagement and linguistic capabilities are crucial for effective security operations.

  3. Maritime Security Operations and Economic Incentives: Chinese PSCs have found a niche in maritime security, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, where piracy has driven up insurance costs. By providing security services at a lower cost than Western counterparts, Chinese PSCs offer a financially viable solution for shipping companies, potentially saving significant amounts on insurance premiums. This economic incentive drives the demand for Chinese PSCs in high-risk maritime regions, where they continue to expand their presence.

  4. Potential for Expansion into Private Military Operations: While China currently focuses on PSCs rather than Private Military Companies (PMCs), there are indications that this could change. The increasing need for stability in volatile regions linked to BRI projects might push China to develop more robust private military capabilities. This could include integrating advanced technologies such as AI, facial recognition, and cyber operations, allowing Chinese PSCs to offer more comprehensive security solutions in the future.

  5. Strategic and Military Ramifications: Chinese PSCs, while primarily focused on commercial security, are seen as extensions of the Chinese state, particularly the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Their operations abroad, including in regions like the South China Sea and Africa, could serve as precursors to more militarized roles, providing local intelligence and logistical support that could enhance PLA operations. The concern is that these PSCs could be used to assert Chinese influence subtly, such as in maritime disputes, without directly involving the Chinese military, thus complicating international responses.


The Rise of Chinese Private Security Companies (PSCs and PMCs)

(Released Aug 26th)

 

THE RED LINE'S EPISODE 124 READING LIST:


I: Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones, and the Future of War

- By Alessandro Arduino


II: Downfall: Prigozhin, Putin, and the new fight for the future of Russia

- By Mark Galeotti


III: The New Rules of War

- By Sean McFate


 

For episode transcripts, monthly geopolitics Q&A’s, member-only videos and to support the show, check out our Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/theredlinepodcast


 

This episode is dedicated to our Patreon members: Aaron Spray, William Shifflette, Icejjfish, Samuel Cox, Bennett Thompson, Nick, Franck, Shelley


 

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