Could Europe Defend Itself Without the US?

The Red Line
1 day ago
9 min read

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cmbJNCQIUpc

Long treated as the immovable foundation of European security, America’s role in NATO is now being questioned more openly than at any point in decades, as Washington signals doubts about its commitment to the continent and debates whether US forces should be pulled back toward other theatres. On paper, Europe still looks formidable. Its militaries outspend Russia, field large numbers of troops, aircraft, ships, and armoured vehicles, and are already beginning a major rearmament push. Yet behind those headline numbers lies a much messier reality. Much of Europe’s ability to fight as a single coherent force still depends on the United States: its intelligence networks, satellites, airlift, logistics, targeting systems, command structures, missile defence, and nuclear deterrent. Replacing those capabilities would not simply mean buying more tanks or raising defence budgets, but rebuilding the operating system that allows NATO to function in a crisis. And with Russia’s war economy still running, its northern military districts being rebuilt, and the Baltic states sitting exposed on NATO’s front line, the question is not just whether Europe could defend itself without America, but whether it could do so quickly enough. Our panel of experts examines what the US still provides, what Europe would need to replace, and whether Moscow’s timelines may move faster than Europe’s.

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EPISODE SUMMARY:

PART I: Caveats, Conflicts and Committees - (02:48)

with Ruben Stewart

- Snr. Fellow for Land Warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies

- Fmr. Infantry Officer in the New Zealand Defence Forces

- Fmr. Military and Armed Groups Advisor for the ICRC

Europe’s central problem is not aggregate combat power, but the loss of the US “operating system”: The argument is not that European NATO lacks tanks, aircraft, troops, or budgets in absolute terms, but that much of NATO’s ability to fight coherently depends on US-provided connective tissue. This includes theatre-wide ISR, intelligence fusion, dynamic targeting, command and control, airlift, logistics, staff capacity, and the architecture that turns national militaries into a single operational system. Without that US layer, European operations would likely become slower, more deliberate, more episodic, and more attritional.
A US drawdown from Europe would also damage US global power projection, not just European defence: Europe functions as a forward base for US operations well beyond the continent, including logistics, medical evacuation, naval support, and air operations linked to the Middle East and other theatres. US facilities such as Ramstein remain critical nodes for sustaining American operations, while Europe also provides a major market for US defence industry exports. A serious rupture in US-Europe defence relations could therefore weaken both NATO deterrence and Washington’s own ability to project power globally.
Moving US forces out of Europe does not automatically solve Indo-Pacific force shortfalls: The transcript makes the point that the real constraint for Indo-Pacific planners is often not a few thousand additional troops, but scarce high-end munitions, air defence interceptors, long-range strike assets, and enabling capabilities. If those stockpiles are being consumed in other theatres, including the Middle East, then redeploying ground formations from Europe does little to solve the core problem. For Indo-Pacific Command, a few hundred additional missiles may matter far more than a brigade moved from Germany.
NATO’s command structure remains deeply dependent on US personnel, systems, and experience: Although NATO’s Joint Force Commands are moving towards greater European command responsibility, with European officers taking over Norfolk, Naples, and Brunssum, many key component commands remain US-led. US officers also bring operational experience and planning familiarity that many European headquarters lack, particularly in complex, theatre-scale synchronisation. The example of Maven Smart System is especially important, but while NATO has only recently adopted a US-developed AI-enabled planning tool that American officers have been using for years.
The Baltic posture is politically powerful but militarily thin, making reinforcement and cohesion decisive: NATO’s forward deployments in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland function as deterrent tripwires rather than self-sufficient defensive formations. Their political value lies in ensuring that any Russian attack would immediately create casualties across multiple NATO member states, making Article 5 politically harder to evade. However, Article 5 does not automatically produce a uniform military response, and the Baltic states’ lack of strategic depth means that without rapid reinforcement, US enablers, and allied political cohesion, the current posture would struggle to hold against a reconstituted Russian offensive.

PART II: The Baltic Battle - (28:08)

with Ben Barry

- Ass. Fellow forDefence and Military Analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies

- Fmr. Commander for a NATO Multinational Brigade

- Author of "The Rise and Fall of the British Army 1975-2025".

The Baltic defence problem is not simply one of forward mass, but of survivable depth: Ben Barry argues that the tactical dilemmas facing NATO in the Baltic states closely resemble those faced by forward-deployed NATO land forces during the Cold War. A linear defence along the Russian border would be highly vulnerable to Russian artillery, air strikes and electronic warfare. The implication is that Baltic defence cannot rely on static forward presence alone; it requires depth, dispersal, rehearsed reinforcement plans and the ability to absorb early strikes without collapsing.
Russia remains dangerous despite its losses in Ukraine, particularly because escalation could occur quickly and unintentionally: The transcript stresses that Russia’s army has taken immense losses, but its air force and navy still retain substantial combat power that could be employed outside Ukraine. Barry also highlights the risk of rapid escalation through miscalculation, particularly around NATO and Russian aircraft operating in proximity over the Black Sea. This means the European threat environment is not limited to a deliberate, long-planned Russian land offensive; it also includes accidental confrontation, rogue command decisions and degraded command-and-control dynamics.
The US presence in Europe is a core enabler of both NATO deterrence and American global power projection: US forces in Europe are not merely a defensive tripwire against Russia; they provide air power, ISR, corps-level command capacity, aviation, artillery, logistics and rapid reinforcement capability. The US intelligence architecture, including signals intelligence, reconnaissance satellites and CIA resources, is presented as a capability that no European state, and arguably Europe collectively, can fully replicate. The transcript also underlines that European bases such as Ramstein, Sigonella, Rota, RAF Mildenhall, RAF Fairford and Stuttgart allow the US to project power into the Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean and the wider European theatre.
A US withdrawal from Europe would be expensive for Washington and strategically damaging for Europe:The text pushes back against the idea that leaving Europe would automatically save the United States money, because Washington would still need to recreate access, logistics, tanker capacity, basing, carrier availability and medical support elsewhere. Relocating capabilities to more exposed theatres would likely increase costs and operational risk, particularly for high-value aircraft and sustainment networks. For Europe, IISS work cited in the transcript estimates that replacing the US capability gap would cost roughly €1 trillion and take at least a decade.
The dangerous mismatch is between Europe’s rearmament timeline and Russia’s potential reconstitution timeline: Barry argues that if the war in Ukraine ends while Russia maintains its war economy and defence production, Moscow could be ready within a couple of years for a limited attack on Europe, including the Baltic states. Europe, by contrast, would need many years to replace US capabilities, even with higher defence spending and accelerated procurement. The immediate priority is therefore not just new platforms, but ammunition, logistics, large-scale exercises, mobilisation capacity and readiness at a level closer to Cold War NATO practice.

PART III: The Dangerous District - (41:26)

with Neil Melvin

- Head of the Arctic and High North Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

- Fmr. Dir. of International Security at RUSI

- Fmr. Dir. of Research at SIPRI

Russia’s Baltic problem is now primarily political-strategic, not a conventional NATO-wide warfighting proposition: Neil Melvin argues that Moscow is unlikely to seek a direct, toe-to-toe military confrontation with NATO, because even a rearming NATO would remain too powerful. Instead, the Baltic states offer Russia a way to use limited military force to create a political crisis inside NATO and the EU. The objective would be less about conquering Europe and more about testing whether Euro-Atlantic unity holds under pressure.
The reactivation of the Leningrad Military District signals a major Russian refocus on the northern and north-eastern flank: The transcript frames the re-established Leningrad Military District as Moscow’s response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, which has transformed the Baltic Sea and the wider European north. The district now covers a strategic arc from Kaliningrad and the Baltic approaches through Finland, Norway and the Arctic, placing it opposite a much larger NATO frontier. Although many of these formations remain skeletal because manpower and equipment are still being pulled into Ukraine, the structural direction of travel suggests Russia no longer sees the north-west as a secondary theatre.
Kaliningrad is conventionally weakened but remains an escalation node, especially through missiles and potential nuclear signalling: Kaliningrad has reportedly been hollowed out to support the war in Ukraine, reducing its conventional garrison and weakening its former role as a major anti-access bastion in the Baltic. However, Melvin stresses that it remains heavily militarised, with missile systems able to reach across the Baltic, southern Scandinavia, Poland and Germany. Its vulnerability could create a “use it or lose it” dynamic in a crisis, especially if Russia believes NATO would strike Kaliningrad early and therefore considers rapid missile or tactical nuclear signalling.
The most plausible Russian scenario may be a limited incursion designed to paralyse NATO decision-making: Rather than launching a full-scale invasion of the Baltic states, Melvin sees a more likely scenario in which Russia seizes a small piece of territory, escalates from hybrid pressure into a limited security incursion, and then challenges NATO to dislodge it. This would exploit the Baltic states’ lack of strategic depth, Russia’s first-mover advantage, and uncertainty around US commitment. The key risk is that some NATO members would push for diplomacy or delay rather than immediate military escalation, giving Moscow time to sow division inside the alliance.
NATO’s “not one inch” posture creates a demanding forward-defence problem that Europe has not fully resolved:The transcript highlights a major unresolved tension: if NATO genuinely intends to defend every inch of allied territory, it cannot simply wait for Russia to cross the border and then mount a delayed counter-offensive from depth. A forward defence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would require more permanently stationed forces, faster decision-making, pre-agreed response options and credible reinforcement before Russia can present NATO with a fait accompli. This is why the Baltic tripwire model is evolving towards larger brigade-level deployments, but there remains a dangerous window before European capabilities, ammunition stocks and coalition frameworks such as the JEF are fully mature.

PART IV: Burning the Beacons - (1:05:38)

with Gen. Philip Breedlove

- Distinguished Professor of the Practice at Georgia Tech’s Sam Nunn School of International Affairs

- Fmr. Supreme Allied Commander Europe

- Fmr. Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force

Forward presence remains central to deterrence because it compresses response timelines: Breedlove argues that the value of forward-deployed forces is often underappreciated outside military planning circles, but remains essential because these forces can react immediately. US sovereign forces already positioned in Europe can be used by the EUCOM commander/SACEUR without waiting for slower deployment processes through Washington. This matters because deterrence depends not only on aggregate NATO force levels, but on whether Moscow believes there is an immediately usable force in theatre.
The credibility of US and NATO deterrence is now as important as capability: Breedlove frames deterrence as the product of capability and credibility, warning that the credibility side of the equation is currently under strain. Even if NATO has substantial combat power on paper, deterrence weakens if Russia doubts whether Washington or other allied capitals would respond decisively. The transcript therefore presents the current uncertainty around US commitment as a deterrence problem in itself, even before any actual withdrawal occurs.
Rapid reinforcement of the Baltics depends heavily on US Tier One forces and pre-positioned heavy equipment: The Baltic problem is fundamentally a race against time: Russia could attempt to create a fait accompli before slower European formations are ready to move. Breedlove therefore emphasises the importance of forward ammunition, fuel, air defence, heavy equipment and “fall-in” forces that can fly in and rapidly use kit already positioned in theatre. Without US forces and enablers in the first-response tier, NATO’s ability to stop a rapid Russian assault before it reaches key objectives would be sharply reduced.
NATO’s reinforcement problem is as much bureaucratic and infrastructural as military: Breedlove highlights the lack of a true “Military Schengen” as a major obstacle to moving forces quickly across Europe, noting that legal, border and ammunition movement restrictions can severely slow deployments. Rail gauge differences, port-to-front transport constraints and limited infrastructure redundancy compound the problem, particularly when moving heavy equipment into the Baltic region. Russia, by contrast, benefits from interior lines and fewer internal movement restrictions, giving it a major time-distance advantage in a crisis.
A US drawdown from Europe would not automatically strengthen Indo-Pacific Command and would damage other US theatres: Breedlove rejects the idea that assets removed from Europe would naturally solve Indo-Pacific shortfalls, noting that a Taiwan or Western Pacific scenario is not primarily a tank-heavy land campaign. Europe-based US assets also support AFRICOM, including airlift, refuelling and command arrangements for operations in Africa. The broader point is that Europe is not just a defensive theatre; it is a strategic platform for US operations across Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and beyond.